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MAD WOMEN AND DESPERATE GIRLS:
INFANTICIDE AND CHILD MURDER IN LAW AND
MYTH
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT*
“Can a mother forget the baby at her breast and have no compassion for
the child she has borne?” 1
Scarlet the Cat of Brooklyn, NY: “In a motherly show of courage, a cat
raced into a burning building to rescue her five kittens, one by one. And
then with her eyes blistered shut and her paws burned, she made a head
count of her young ones, touching each one with her nose to make sure
they were all safe.” 2

In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom and many other
countries, there is no distinctive legislation addressing the killing of infants
and young children by their mothers. While our British cousins embarked
upon a course of special legislation in 1922 that evolved into a policy of
partial decriminalization and medicalization of maternal infanticide,3 the

*Elizabeth Rapaport, Dickason Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. My research
on infanticide and child homicide began when I was a Visiting Scholar enjoying the
hospitality of the Center for the Study of Law & Society Center at the School of Law,
University of California, Berkeley, in 2001-2002. I am particularly grateful for the
assistance of the law librarians at Boalt Hall, and to the law librarians at UNM School of
Law, and most especially to Lorraine Lester. I was fortunate to have able and diligent
research assistance from Brigid Connelly, of the University of Connecticut School of Law,
and Erin Kutinac, of the University of New Mexico School of Law. I am grateful for
helpful discussions of earlier drafts of this article presented at the University of Delaware,
the University of Connecticut School of Law, and the annual meetings of the Association
for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities and of the Law & Society Association in
2005. Sharon Derrick, Ph.D., Injury Surveillance Coordinator, Disease Control and Medical
Epidemiology, Harris County Public Health and Environmental Services, graciously
assisted me in understanding some of the complexities of child fatality accounting in Texas
and the United States generally.
1. Isaiah 49:15 (New International Version).
2. Sarah Christian, Feline Risks Life to Save Five Kittens, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 1,
1996.
3. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.), amended by Infanticide
Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.).
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United States has no distinct law or even settled policies on infanticide. As
a result, outcomes in cases raising similar mental health defenses can vary
radically, from medical diversion to capital punishment. 4 Yet, in the
United States, as in the United Kingdom, two figures, or archetypes,
dominate representations of infanticide in popular media and in
scholarship: the mad woman and the desperate girl. 5 In the United
Kingdom, settled law and policy reflect the conception of maternal
infanticide as the work of women who are victims of biology gone awry,
and of women and girls who, due to immaturity or adverse circumstances,
are not able to accept the maternal role. 6 In the United States, lacking

4. For example, consider the cases of Andrea Yates, Ellen Feinberg, and Christina
Riggs, three severely depressed women who killed their children. Yates and Feinberg were
also psychotic at the time of their crimes according to the prosecution’s psychiatric experts.
Yates was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life for drowning her five young
children in 2001. See infra. The conviction was reversed in Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215,
222 (Tex. App. 2005). Prosecutors are contesting the reversal. See Andrew Tilghman,
Appeals Court Won’t Review Its Yates Ruling; Prosecutors Vow to Continue the Fight;
Mother Who Killed Her Five Children Could Get New Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 9, 2005,
at B3 (discussing how the conviction turned on the testimony of Dr. Park Dietz, who found
that Yates was sane under Texas law, although psychotic). Ellen Feinberg stabbed her two
sons, six and ten years of age, killing one and grievously injuring the second in Champaign,
Illinois in 2002. Steve Bauer, Fate Hinges on Mental Health, NEWS GAZETTE (Champaign,
Ill.), Dec 4, 2002. Defense and state psychiatrists agreed that Feinberg was insane under
Illinois law. She was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Dietz, the state’s expert,
found that Feinberg suffered from severe depression and was psychotic when she stabbed
her sons. Steve Bauer, A Mother’s Madness, NEWS GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Dec 8, 2002
[hereinafter Bauer, Mother’s Madness]. Christina Riggs was sentenced to death in 1999 for
the murder of her two children, aged two and five. Riggs v. State, 3 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Ark.
1999). She was executed in Arkansas in 2000. Death Penalty Information Center,
Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (last
visited Jan. 25, 2006). Suicidally depressed, Riggs “didn’t want to die and leave [her] kids
behind . . . .” Riggs, 3 S.W.3d at 311. She killed them but failed in her attempted suicide.
Id. at 307-08.
5. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 22-29, 42-49 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Mothers
Who Kill] (providing an outstanding treatment of the issues of law and law reform raised by
teenage neonaticide). The question of justice for mentally ill women who kill their children
came to the fore again in 2002 in the Yates case. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Who is
Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 1 (2003)
(providing an excellent treatment of the Yates case and the issues of law and law reform it
raises); Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad, 2
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71 (1991) (an influential article developing the theme that women
who kill their infants are sorted into dichotomous categories, mad and bad, both of which
reflect gender stereotypical distortions of the defendants and their cases).
6. In the 1970s, British reformers sought and failed to expand the protection of the
Infanticide Act to explicitly include women and girls overwhelmed by poverty or their own
immaturity or lack of coping skills. De facto, however, British practice had expanded in
that direction and continued to expand, treating such women and girls as females thwarted
in their development as mothers by social and psychological limitations or adversity. See
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settled law, the dynamic in high profile infanticide cases such as those of
Andrea Yates 7 in Houston, and Susan Smith 8 in South Carolina, often
propel prosecutors to seek severe sentences and to exploit the counternarrative of evil. While both explanations—evil and biology—have
cultural resonance, the biological explanation may have more traction.
Prosecutors have learned that infanticide defendants have powerful allies in
prevalent conceptions of motherhood.9 That a mature woman could be
both a sane and lethal mother is not an easy sell. Indeed, prosecutors have
difficulty convincing juries that lethal fathers are evil as well,10 but cases
about fathers rarely attract the notoriety that cases about mothers spawn.
The mad woman and the desperate girl are beguiling stereotypes that
distort the social facts of infanticide and child homicide in the United
States. Men commit more homicides of infants and children than women.11
Why, then, do treatments of infanticide in the popular media, and in legal
and forensic scholarship, amplify the role of women and mute the role of
men? Why is the mental health of male killers of relatively little interest,
despite the fact that the population of fathers who kill includes substantial

generally R. D. Mackay, The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children, 1993 CRIM. L.
REV. 21, 21.
7. Yates, 171 S.W.3d at 215.
8. Susan Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life for drowning her
two sons. The Smith verdict was met with mixed reactions. See Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury
Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, §1, at 1
[hereinafter Bragg, Carolina Jury].
9. Probing the social and legal construction of motherhood has been central to the work
of critical feminism. Among the seminal contributions are MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
(1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 7 (1993); and Carol Sanger, M is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 15 (1992). This literature disentangles and demystifies the role of biology,
culture, and law in prevalent conceptions of motherhood.
10. See Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 536-40 (1999). Goaded by the frustrations prosecutors
experience when juries balk at finding parents of both sexes and other caretakers guilty of
intentional killing in child abuse deaths, Phipps advocates legislation creating a felony
murder offense, predicated on child abuse. The effect of such legislation would be to
relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving intent to kill or recklessness in order to
secure a murder conviction. Id. at 584-93.
11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE
U.S.: INFANTICIDE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm
[hereinafter BJS, INFANTICIDE] (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). Over a twenty-five year period,
from 1976 to 2002, mothers accounted for thirty percent and fathers for thirty-one percent of
homicides of children under five years of age. Male acquaintances—the boyfriends and
lovers of mothers—however, accounted for an additional twenty-three percent of homicides
of children under five years of age. Id.
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numbers of men suffering from psychosis and severe depression? 12 The
majority of homicides of infants and children are committed in the course
of child abuse by parents and other household intimates who do not suffer
from severe mental illness. 13 Why is our attention attracted to the cases
where a biological explanation is offered for maternal lethality and not the
larger class of child abuse homicides committed by both sexes? 14 When
the subject is infanticide and child murder, in sum, mothers who kill are
brought to the foreground, the role of men is obscured, and the focus is not
on intra-family violence, but rather on the piquant question, “Is the mother
mad or bad?” 15
My answer to the questions propounded above, in brief, is that
infanticide, from the dawn of the criminalization of this ancient practice to
the present, has been less about the protection of children than the
regulation of women. We profess our commitment to children, but our
practice reveals an unimpressive record of child protection and abiding
anxieties about female sexuality and motherhood. Our attention slides
from the nominal subject—protecting children—to the interesting subject
of motherhood. Thus, while the legal regime in the United Kingdom
recognizes the links between maternal mental illness and child homicide, it
does not provide a beacon that can lead us to a comprehensive policy
addressing infanticide and child homicide. We must wean ourselves from
our excessive preoccupation with female deviance and attend to other
causes of child homicide if we are to craft effective prevention policies and
just criminal law responses.
I begin this article with a comparison between the stereotype-dominated
understanding of infanticide and child homicide in the United States and
the statistical landscape it obscures. I then turn to the history of the crime
of infanticide, a history which confirms that a fascination with deviant
women has long dominated the story of infanticide. The article concludes

12. Phillip J. Resnick, Child Murder by Parents: A Psychiatric Review of Filicide, 126
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 325 (1969) [hereinafter Resnick, Child Murder]. In this path-breaking
work in the late 1960s, Phillip J. Resnick, M.D. found that a significant number of infant
and child homicides are committed by fathers with severe mental health problems. Despite
this well-known and seminal work, more recent scholars have largely ignored male parents
who kill their infants and children. See Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A
Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414 (1970) [hereinafter
Resnick, Murder of the Newborn].
13. David Finkelhor, The Homicides of Children and Youth: A Developmental
Perspective, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE
17, 24-26 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski eds., 1997).
14. See Phipps, supra note 10, at 542. The exception is scholarship that reflects the
perspective of prosecutors. See id. at 536-37.
15. Wilczynski, supra note 5, uses this telling phrase in the title of her article.
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with the exploration of what I call the “Good Mother Defense.” That
exploration reveals the extent to which the fate of a woman tried for child
homicide hinges on whether the jury sees her as a good mother, rather than
on the prosecutors’ ability to prove the elements of the crime charged.
I. INFANTICIDE AND CHILD HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES IN MYTH
AND FACT, WITH AN ILLUSTRATIVE LOOK AT TEXAS
In 1997, a young Dallas County matron named Darlie Routier was
convicted in the stabbing death of two of her young sons, aged five and six,
and sentenced to death.16 The Routier case did not achieve the degree of
sustained national and international notoriety attained by that of Andrea
Yates, the Houston mother who drowned all five of her children in 2001,17
or Susan Smith, the South Carolina mother who rolled her car and with it
her two young sons into a lake in 1996, then accused a fictional black
stranger of kidnapping her children. 18 The eyes of Texas, however, were
fixed on Darlie Routier, as hers was one of that class of maternal
infanticide and child homicide cases that had the potential to captivate
media audiences: those committed by middle class, married, typically
white, women. 19 Unlike Yates, Routier did not defend on grounds of
insanity, but instead, denied her guilt. Why, Texas mused, did Routier
erupt in slaughter in the midst of her prosperous suburban life, anchored in
a successful marriage? How could Routier, even though her skirts were
short, 20 kill her children? Although answers to these questions proved
elusive, the state of Texas sought and obtained capital justice for the slain
children. Prosecutors proclaimed at her trial,

16. See Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Routier was
convicted of the capital murder of a child under six, her five-year-old son Daman. The
evidence also supported the stabbing and killing of her six-year-old son Devon, with which
she was not charged. See id.
17. Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215, 216-17 (Tex. App. 2005).
18. Bragg, Carolina Jury, supra note 8, at 1.
19. See John W. Gonzalez, A Human Tragedy/Trial to Open in Deaths of Two Children,
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter Gonzalez, Human Tragedy]. The Ellen
Feinberg case is another example of such a regional sensation; Feinberg is herself a
physician and is married to another physician. See Bauer, Mother’s Madness, supra note 4.
20. See Gonzalez, Human Tragedy, supra note 19 (criticism of Routier’s taste was a
theme in the publicity surrounding her case which took note of Routier’s body piercings and
tattoos); see also John W. Gonzalez, Routier Gave Baby Sitter Drugs, Humiliated Kids,
Witnesses Say, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1997, at A13 [hereinafter Gonzalez, Baby Sitter]
(quoting a witness saying that “Routier dressed ‘very tacky—everything was showing’”).
Readers of this article may draw their own conclusions about Routier’s style by viewing the
2003 television documentary about her case. See 48 Hours Mystery: Precious Angels, A
Shocking Crime (CBS television broadcast Aug. 20, 2003).
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If you kill our children, we will come after you[.] . . . When you take the
life of a child in the state of Texas, you better get ready to pay the
price[.] 21
I ask you to have as much compassion as she had for her children[.] . . . I
ask you to tell the nation that in Texas we protect our children. If you
harm our children, you will feel the full extent of our laws. 22

These boasts, or promises, reflect Texas law, which has ample statutory
grounds for severe treatment of child homicide. The murder of a child
under six may on that account be prosecuted as capital murder. 23 Texas
law also supplies a means of sentencing someone to life or as much as
ninety-nine years imprisonment if he or she intentionally or knowingly
engages in conduct that causes serious injury to a child; thus, someone who
cannot be successfully prosecuted for murder because he or she lacked
intent to kill can be severely punished under Texas law for child abuse that
resulted in the death of the child.24 Should the issue of insanity surface in a
Texas child homicide case, the defendant is confronted with a particularly
forbidding version of the M’Naghten or cognitive test; the sole question
upon which the defendant’s legal responsibility turns is whether he or she
knew the act of killing was wrong. 25 There need be no inquiry into, or
proof as to whether mental disease or defect rendered the defendant
incapable of either controlling his or her actions or appreciating the nature
of the crime, as would be the case in more liberal jurisdictions. 26 Thus, in
the case of Andrea Yates, a woman acknowledged by both defense and
prosecution to be gravely mentally ill, it was possible for a jury to find her
sane under Texas law even if they believed her own tormented account of

21. Ralph Winingham, Routier Given Death—Killer Mom Stoic as Sentence Read, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 5, 1997, at A1 (District Attorney Greg Davis, addressing the
jury in the penalty phase of the capital trial).
22. John W. Gonzalez, Jury Orders Death Penalty for Routier: 27-Year-Old
Homemaker Shows Very Little Emotion, HOUS. CHRON., Feb 5, 1997, at A1 (Assistant
District Attorney Sherri Wallace, asking jury to sentence “evil-hearted” Routier to death).
23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon 2005) (if the victim is under six years
of age, a murder is eligible for prosecution as capital murder). Texas is one of at least ten
states that treats murder of a child as a circumstance permitting capital punishment.
24. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 22.04 (Vernon 2005) (a person commits the
felony in the first degree, Injury to a Child, if he intentionally or knowingly causes serious
injury to child fourteen years of age or younger).
25. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2005); see Denno, supra note 5, at 12-17
(outlining the M’Naghten test and the Texas version of the test).
26. For a history and survey of the tests used in insanity law in the United States, see
Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
S1, S4-S9 (Supp. 2002).
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her struggle to save her children from Satan.27
In the wake of the Yates trial in 2002, Texas media gave extensive
coverage to a small, shocking spate of child homicides committed by
middle class, married mothers. Unlike Yates, whose sole taste of legal
mercy was a life sentence where death could have been imposed, two of
these women, Lisa Diaz 28 and Deanna Laney, were acquitted by reason of
insanity, 29 and the third, Dena Schlosser, was initially found incompetent to
stand trial. 30 Two of these mothers, Laney31 and Schlosser, 32 like Yates,
were intensely religious and obedient to command hallucinations. The
third, Lisa Ann Diaz, suffered from the delusion that death would release
her and her children from imagined disease. 33 All three cases, like that of
Andrea Yates, were lurid, brutal, and reeked of madness. Schlosser
severed her infant daughter’s arms in a tortured, idiosyncratic submission
to a charismatic preacher and a verse in the bible.34 Laney bashed the
heads of her six and eight-year-old sons with a rock in response to divine
“signs.” 35 Although it is possible that the leniency accorded these women
is in some part a reaction to the outcry against illiberal Texas law in the

27. Yates condemned herself as possessed by Satan, and therefore a bad mother who
had ruined her children. Denno, supra note 5, at 42-43. She killed them so that their early
deaths would gain them entrance to heaven; had they grown to maturity, their responsibility
for the evil in them for which she was responsible would have damned them. Id. Yet Yates
knew she had done legal wrong; she herself called the police to notify them of her crimes.
28. Glenna Whitley, Psycho Mom, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2005. Diaz, a Latina,
otherwise fits the high notoriety profile: Although she was the product of privation, her
second marriage, to Angel Diaz, a well-educated quality control manager, allowed her to
become a suburban stay-at-home wife and mom. See id.
29. Rick Casey, Mad Moms, Insane Law, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2004, at B1.
30. Thomas Korosec, Accused Mother Not Fit for Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2005.
at B1.
31. Lee Hancock, Driven by a VOICE . . . , DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2004, at
1H. Laney had no known history of mental illness, but psychiatrists, including Dr. Deitz,
agreed she was insane when she killed her children. Laney “believed God had chosen her
and Ms. Yates to be witnesses foretold in the book of Revelation . . . and would preach
God’s word.” Id.
32. Jennifer Emily, Dad’s “Lack of Emotion” in Baby’s Death in Psychiatric Report,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb 11, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter Emily, Lack of Emotion]
(recounting Dena Schlosser’s psychiatric history and the circumstances of her crime); see
also Jennifer Emily, Mom Thanked God After Attack, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.16,
2004, at 4B.
33. Whitley, supra note 28.
34. Emily, Lack of Emotion, supra note 32. The bible verse, from Matthew, was: “If thy
right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of
thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.” Thomas
Korosec, Mom to Officer: “I Felt Like I Had To”; New Details Emerge in Case:
Psychiatrist to Weigh Woman’s Mental State, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 15, 2004, at B4.
35. Whitley, supra note 28.
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wake of the Yates case, 36 deranged mothers had received leniency in
Texas long before Andrea Yates became a synonym for injustice to this
class of defendants in Texas and elsewhere in the United States. 37
The Laney, Diaz, and Schlosser cases provide Texas with a distorted
prism through which to view the landscape of infanticide, just as the Yates
case and the even more media-genic Susan Smith case misdirected the
nation at large. Notorious cases such as these nurture myths, or
misconceptions, about infanticide. 38
One myth is that infants and small children are safe in the bosoms of
their families. Notorious trials foster the comforting notion that infanticidal
killers are rare instances of madness or abject moral failure so exotic as to
defy understanding by the good, good-enough, and not-so-good parents that
make up the public and trial juries. In fact, children under five years of age
are exposed to considerable homicide risk at home. While the incidence of
homicide of victims under five years of age is a subject of dispute, even
estimates at the conservative end of the range challenge the notion that the
youngest Americans are safe at home. 39 There is no disputing that the
36. See, e.g., Rick Casey, Devils on the Head of a Pin, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2004, at
A17; Rick Casey, Yates Wins: Shrink Was Delusional, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2005, at B1;
see also Casey, supra note 29, at B1.
37. Two well-publicized cases were those of Evonne Rodriquez and Juana Leija.
Rodriquez, a schizophrenic, was acquitted by reason of insanity for killing her four-monthold son in 1997. Todd Ackerman, Confined Patient Pregnant Again, HOUS. CHRON., Nov.
8, 2004, at A1. Leija attempted to drown six of her seven children in Buffalo Bayou. Four
were saved by passersby and two drowned. She received a ten year probationary sentence
in recognition of mental illness exacerbated by an abusive husband. Rosanna Ruiz, Woman
Who Threw Children in Bayou is Mending Her Life, HOUS. CHRON., July 4, 2001, at A29.
38. The term “infanticide” has disparate and overlapping connotations, one of which is
the killing of a newborn or infant by its mother or parent. Other usages do not involve any
limitation on the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim, nor do they limit the age of the
child strictly to infancy. This article adopts the more comprehensive usage. See, e.g., BJS,
INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (the U.S Department of Justice, defines “infanticide” as the
homicide of a child less than five years of age by any perpetrator). Including young
children in the “infanticide” category is useful because infants and young children face a
similar magnitude of risk and source of risk of homicide. The focus of this article is on
homicide of infants and young children by their parents and other household intimates.
39. Estimates of the number of child homicides vary. U.S. Department of Justice annual
statistics may be taken as establishing the lower bound; BJS reports between 550 and
slightly less than 800 infanticides homicides of children under five per annum over the ten
year period from 1991 to 2000. See BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11. The number of
homicides of all victims ranged from around 15,500 to 24,700 over the same period.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.:
HOMICIDE
VICTIMIZATION,
1950-2002,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006). The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that approximately one thousand
children under five perished by child abuse and neglect in 2001. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2001:
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majority of infanticides are perpetrated by the parents of the victims, and
that the step-parents, lovers of parents, other family, and other caretakers
fill out the cast of lethal agents. 40 In contrast, children between five and
twelve years of age are the least likely age group to die by homicide, 41 but
the source of risk is the same for younger and older children: the majority
of older children who perish by homicide are victims of their parents and
other household intimates.42 Teenagers, who are at high risk of homicide,
die at the hands of other teens and young adults.43
A second misconception is that infanticide is a woman’s crime and
indeed a mother’s crime. Parents are responsible for infanticidal killings in
the majority of cases; almost equal numbers of mothers and fathers kill
victims under five years of age—thirty and thirty-one percent
respectively. 44 Boyfriends and lovers—“male acquaintances” in the
parlance of the US Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics—

FATALITIES, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm01/chapterfive.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006). Another report estimates this population to be at least two
thousand. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, A NATION’S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 9 (1995) [hereinafter,
ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE]. Some experts argue that underreporting is more
extensive. See generally Bernard Ewigman et al., The Missouri Child Fatality Study:
Underreporting of Maltreatment Fatalities Among Children Younger Than Five Years of
Age, 1983 Through 1986, 91 PEDIATRICS 330 (1993); Phillip W. McClain et al., Estimates of
Fatal Child Abuse and Neglect, United States, 1979 through 1988, 91 PEDIATRICS 338
(1993). At the upper bound of estimation, the homicide risk of young children exceeds that
of adults. See ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE, supra at 8. The public’s ignorance of the
extent of abuse and neglect fatalities can be attributed to poor investigative and accounting
practices of law enforcement and medical and child protection agencies. Id. at 8-9; see also
Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 23 (noting a second reason for underestimation, namely,
ambiguity about whether cases of negligent maltreatment meet the standards for criminal
homicide). There are plausible explanations for why the true rate of infanticidal crime is
uncertain, contested, and the subject of such widely varying estimates. Homicides of young
children are difficult to distinguish from accidental deaths (was the child pushed or did she
fall?) and from death by natural processes (was the baby suffocated or stillborn or die of
sudden infant crib death?). Police and child protection investigations are in many cases
perfunctory, of poor quality, or absent. There are also questions about appropriate criteria to
be used in determining whether to count child maltreatment deaths as homicides in cases
where homicide charges were not pursued.
40. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (reporting that between 1976-2002, only three
percent of homicide victims under five years of age were known to have been killed by
strangers).
41. Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that the majority of homicide victims five to
twelve years of age are killed by family members).
42. Id. at 26-27.
43. Id. at 19.
44. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11 (therefore, in total, parents were responsible for
sixty-one percent of infanticides).
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are responsible for an additional twenty-three percent of infanticides.45
Men predominate in the homicide of children less than one year of age, as
they do with the older under-fives. 46 Only newborns and children under
one week in age are at greatest risk from their mothers. 47
The third myth or distortion is an exaggerated notion of the prevalence
of severe mental illness in the population who commit infanticide. 48 The
post-Yates Texas trio had psychiatric histories that inevitably raise
questions about whether families, doctors and social agencies could have
acted to avert these homicides and alleviated the suffering of these afflicted
women. 49 Similarly, those who followed the Yates case learned that
Andrea Yates was diagnosed as a schizophrenic with psychotic features,
had attempted suicide, and had suffered from bouts of postpartum
psychosis. 50 Likewise, the sentencing phase of Susan Smith’s death
penalty trial revealed that Smith had been molested as a teenager by her

45. Id. (According to BJS, in total eighty-two percent of infanticides were committed by
males).
46. See Mary D. Overpeck et al., Risk Factors for Infant Homicide in the United States,
339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1211 (1998) (reporting a survey of relevant literature and
noting that the majority of perpetrators of homicides of infants older than one week are
male).
47. See L. Paulozzi, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Variation in Homicide
Risk During Infancy—United States, 1989-98, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
187, 189 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5109.pdf (reporting
that of those child fatalities treated as homicides by the CDC, “89% of the known
perpetrators of infants killed in the first week of life were female, usually the mother”).
Paulozzi found that, between 1989 and 1998, 9.1 percent of homicides of children under one
year of age occurring during the first week of life. Id. at 187-88.
48. Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12, at 328-30. Resnick identified five “motives”
for parental child murder in his seminal work; three of these are: unwanted infant, accidental
death resulting from child beating, and revenge upon a spouse. Id. These three categories
have failed to inspire the same subsequent research attention as the two other categories,
both involving mental illness: severe depression and psychosis. See id. Two of the
categories, child beating and spousal revenge, prefigure a more contemporary perspective,
which sees child abuse and therefore child fatalities as integral to problems of family
violence. See ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE supra note 39, at 14-15. The authors of the
prosecution-oriented report dispute the assumption that abusive parents who kill are usually
mentally ill, and indeed find persuasive that the extreme force employed in many abuse
cases suggests that many abusive parents are conscious of risk of death. Id. To recognize
the importance of domestic violence in the landscape of child homicide, however, does not
necessarily lead to a punitive perspective. See generally Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft,
Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH
SERVICES 97 (1988). It is also integral to feminist work, such as that of Stark and Flitcraft,
who emphasize the importance of poverty alleviation, female empowerment, and the ill
effects of at least tacit acceptance of men as inherently violent. Id.
49. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
50. See generally Denno, supra note 5, at 26-36.
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stepfather, 51 that she suffered from severe and recurrent depression, 52 (and
that her mother had refused to allow treatment when depression surfaced in
the wake of the molestation, 53 and that she, like Yates, had attempted
suicide. 54 While delusional psychosis and severe depression are very real
features of the infanticide landscape, prevalent in parents of both sexes who
kill, the largest fraction of infanticides are “child abuse” or “abuse and
neglect” fatalities.55 These are homicides by parents and members, or
familiars, of the household that have the characteristics that, if proven,
would constitute a range of offenses from criminally negligent homicide to
first degree and capital murder. The majority of these deaths are not the
product of an intent to kill.56 They result from negligent or reckless failure
to provide care, or with even greater frequency, the infliction of violence
on the frail and vulnerable bodies of infants and young children.57 These
children die because the violence inflicted upon them far exceeds any safe
or measured expression of anger, frustration, or discipline, not for the first
time, in many or most cases, but for the final and fatal time. Although
mentally ill parents like Yates pose grave risks to children and are
sometimes severely punished despite their afflictions, the majority of those
who kill infants and small children are sane by the standards of the most
liberal jurisdictions in the United States.
Turning to the phenomenon of teenage neonaticide, just as with mature
women, it is the middle class teenager that captivates the public, rather than
the larger class of such crimes committed in poverty. Neonaticide in any
social class is typically an instrumental act, however fraught the
circumstances may be for the teenager or young woman who refuses
motherhood. 58 Among the most publicized of such cases in recent years
are those of two New Jersey teenagers, Melissa Drexler and Amy
Grossberg. Melissa Drexler suffocated her newborn in the bathroom of a
banquet hall while attending her senior prom in New Jersey, disposed of
51. Rick Bragg, In South Carolina, a Mother’s Defense, and Life, Could Hinge on 2
Choices, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, §1, at 12 [hereinafter Bragg, Mother’s Defense].
52. Id.
53. Rick Bragg, Arguments Begin in Susan Smith Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at
A10 [hereinafter Bragg, Arguments Begin].
54. Id.
55. Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 24; see also ADVISORY BOARD, CHILD ABUSE supra note
39, at 8-9.
56. See Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 24.
57. See id. at 23-25. Finkelhor estimates that only a third of the homicides of children
under one are what he labels “infanticides,” i.e., the killing of unwanted children or children
who are victims of mentally ill or incompetent, disorganized, or overwhelmed caretakers.
Id. at 24-25.
58. See generally Resnick, Murder of the Newborn, supra note 12.
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the body in the trash, and returned to the dance floor. 59 She earned the
sobriquet of “Prom Mom,” pled to aggravated manslaughter, received a
sentence of fifteen years in prison, and served two years prior to release.60
Amy Grossberg and Brian Peterson killed their newborn, which was
conceived in their senior year in high school. 61 Peterson was sentenced to
serve two years in prison and Grossberg two-and-a-half years in prison in
plea agreements. Both these young women concealed their pregnancies (in
Drexler’s case from her boyfriend as well as her family and friends) and
were unable or unwilling to acknowledge that they would in the normal
course give birth and become mothers.62 The media reflected the two
competing narratives of teenage neonaticide with cultural traction: 63 that
these young people were depraved and licentious, and that these not-yetwomen were overwhelmed because they lacked the maternal resources that
grown women have. The depravity account may have gained conviction if
it was not inspired by the social status of the teenagers.64 Although there
have been some severe sentences in teenage neonaticide cases, the
institutional response tends to be rather mild. 65
In Texas, the consequences for teens and young women tend toward
greater severity. 66 Under Texas law, persons as young as fourteen can be
59. Ronald Smothers, Guilty Plea by Mother, 20, in Prom Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1998, at B1.
60. Karen Demasters, “Prom Mom” Released, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at 6.
61. Karl Vick, Young Love and Dead Baby Tear at the Heart of Delaware, WASH. POST,
Nov. 22, 1996, at A1.
62. Abby Goodnough & Bruce Webber, The Picture of Ordinary; Before Prom Night, a
Suspect Was the Girl Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at B1.
63. Media portraits of these teens sometimes reflected both views. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Gleick, Three Kids, One Death; They Were Happy and Well-Off. Why Did Two Teens
Dump Their Baby, Possibly After Crushing Its Skull?, TIME, Dec. 2, 1996, at 69; see also
Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 27-30 (discussing the ambivalence teen
neonaticide cases induce in society).
64. Vick, supra note 61. Grossberg and Peterson were from a privileged family in a
privileged community. Both, for example, were described as living in a “gabled tract
mansion.” Id. Drexler may have appeared to many who followed her case to be more
privileged than she in fact was. The Prom Mom was lower middle class. She hoped to
pursue a course in fashion design after graduation from vocational high school. Her
sobriquet may have suggested more social ease and cachet. See Goodnough & Webber,
supra note 62.
65. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 25-30.
66. A question that can be raised but cannot easily be answered is the extent to which
infanticidal teens and young women escape prosecution because of the sympathetic
response of street-level bureaucrats, such as police. See Michelle Oberman, Understanding
Infanticide in Context: Mothers Who Kill, 1870-1930 and Today, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 707, 733 (2002) (discussing this phenomenon in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Chicago). The question of the survival of this practice is beyond the
scope of this study.
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certified for trial as adults for serious felonies,67 and face an array of
sentences that include life for capital murder, 68 and ninety-nine years for
serious injury of a child. 69 Texas juvenile prosecutors will not brook
medical diversion unless a psychological evaluation establishes that the
teen mother did not comprehend the nature of her act.70 Absent mitigation,
such as rape, incest, mental illness, or retardation, juvenile prosecutors are
likely to seek certification for trial as an adult in a neonaticide case and, if
unsuccessful, to seek a conviction in juvenile court that carries a
determinate sentence as high as forty years.71 The juvenile court has the
power in cases it deems appropriate to deny certification and deny a
determinant sentence.72 The court may prefer to adjudicate the teen as a
delinquent. 73 The effect of either adjudication as a delinquent or a sentence
of a term a years by the juvenile court is that the release date of the teen
then falls to the discretion of Texas Youth Commission (TYC). 74 For a
first degree felony the offender must serve three years. 75 But with this
proviso, the mission of the juvenile justice regime remains rehabilitative.
Thus, while TYC has the power to send a teen convicted of neonaticide to
adult prison to continue serving her sentence, it equally has the power to
release a rehabilitated teen at jeopardy for a decades-long determinant
sentence after a short incarceration. Texas law, culture and practice may
make it unlikely that a teen convicted of neonaticide would escape
incarceration and be subject only to probation or diversion; but, if the teen
avoids certification, criminal sanctions may well approximate the leniency
of other jurisdictions.
Prosecutors report that the incidence of teen neonaticides prosecuted in
Texas is very small. 76 Some confirmation of this judgment is to be found
67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(a)(6) (Vernon 2005); see generally ROBERT O.
DAWSON, TEX. JUVENILE PROB. COMM’N, TEXAS JUVENILE LAW 139 (6th ed. 2004).
68. The murder of a child under six years of age is a crime that is eligible for capital
punishment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8), (b) (Vernon 2005).
69. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 22.04 (Vernon 2005).
70. Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney,
Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (June 29, 2005).
71. Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney,
Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (July 7, 2005); Telephone Interview with Donna Schardt,
Dallas County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in Dallas, Tex. (July 7, 2005).
72. See generally DAWSON, supra note 67, at 422-54.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 441.
76. See Telephone Interview with William Hawkins, Harris County Assistant Dist.
Attorney, Juvenile Div., in Houston, Tex. (June 29, 2005) (William Hawkins could recall
only one such case in his four-and-a-half years as a juvenile prosecutor in Harris County);
see also Telephone Interview with Gary Arie, Dallas County Assistant Dist. Attorney,
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in the paucity of reports of teen neonaticides in the three major Texas
metropolitan newspapers 77 over a period of twelve years. 78 A fifteen-yearold was sentenced to three years youth custody for the crime of
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to a child for the blunt trauma
killing of her child then left in a trash bin.79 An eighteen-year-old was
sentenced to ten years for injury to a child and child endangerment for the
killing of her son and leaving him in a trash bag in her bedroom. 80 A
sixteen-year-old was sentenced to forty-five years for killing her newborn
son. 81
The failure of neonaticidal teenagers to mother may titillate and disturb,
as much perhaps because these young girls are sexually active as because
they coped so disastrously with resulting pregnancies. Such cases,
however, do not challenge or unsettle our investment in women’s
biologically-based virtue in natural mothers. A reassuring explanation is at
hand: due to their youth, these girls have not matured to the point of being
women and mothers.
Although the cases to which the media and the public are drawn involve
married, middle class, and typically white women, and relatively privileged
white teenage girls, the most likely victims of infanticide and child
homicide are children of color,82 born to unmarried mothers, who first gave
Juvenile Div., in Dallas, Tex. (July 13, 2005); Telephone Interview with Kris Moore, supra
note 70 (Kris Moore concurred, as did Gary Arie, who speculated that the Texas Baby
Moses statute, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302 (Vernon 2005), effective 2001, reduced
such crimes and noted that teenage homicides of all sorts are dramatically fewer in recent
years).
77. The three newspapers were the Dallas Morning Herald, the Houston Chronicle, and
the San Antonio Express-News.
78. The period studied was from January 1, 1993 through May 23, 2005.
79. Steve Olafson, Girl Sentenced in Newborn’s Death; Two Relatives Arrested, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 20, 1999, at A25.
80. Pete Slover, Teen Jailed in Baby’s Death Hid Pregnancy, Parents Say Newborn Boy
Was Found Suffocated in Garbage Bag, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 29, 1997, at 1A.
81. Diane Jennings, More Visible, Not More Common; Women Killing Children Nothing
New, but ‘We’re Hearing About More’, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 2002, at 6J (three
neonaticides by adult women were also reported in the three metropolitan dailies in the same
time period); see Infant’s Birth to be Focus of Mother’s Murder Trial, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 6, 1993, at 32A (Susan Bienek was sentenced to nine years for leaving her
newborn child to die in a storage shed); see also Pam Easton, 1 Mom Linked to 2 Abandoned
Babies; Boy Found Dead in Trash Bin 5 Years Ago Related to Girl Left in Ditch, HOUS.
CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, at A34; Thom Marshall, Mother Won’t Plead Insanity in Infant’s
Smothering Death, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 17, 2004, at A9 (Kenisha Berry, who abandoned a
newborn to die and was discovered to have killed another newborn, dubbed “Baby Hope,”
five years earlier, was sentenced to die, although the second victim survived).
82. BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: INFANTICIDE: INFANTICIDE RATES PER 100,000
POPULATION
BY
RACE
OF
VICTIM,
available
at
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birth as teenagers, with little education, who have had further children, and
who live with men who are not the fathers of their children. 83 From these
cases and these social conditions we tend to avert our collective gaze, even
as our attention is drawn to maternal mayhem and madness in a more
privileged strata of society—to white married women and teenage girls
destined for matron status.
The following table presents the results of a survey of the coverage of
infanticide and child homicide 84 in the three largest metropolitan daily
papers in Texas over a twelve year period. 85
TABLE: CHILD HOMICIDE IN THE TEXAS PRESS 1993-2005
NAME
Alexander, Kimberly
Benaissa, Sabrina
Berry, Kenisha
Bienek, Susan
Brown, Katrina
Bush, Amy McKay
Camacho, Angela

SEX
F
F
F
F
F
F
F

RELATIONSHIP
TO VICTIM
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother

NO. OF
ARTICLES
21
42
7
4
3
9
46

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/kidsratestab.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006)
(BJS reports that although the rate of homicide of black children under five years of age has
declined in recent years, it remains substantially higher than that of white children—7.4 per
100,000 versus 2.2 per 100,000); Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 18 (rates among Hispanics
exceed those of whites but are lower than rates among blacks). It has been often observed
that rates of homicide of children less than one-year-old do not vary as much internationally
as do other homicide rates. Id. at 24. While the U.S. rate of homicide of children under the
age of one year old exceeds those of all other industrial nations, the gap becomes much
wider for the one to four year-old age group. See id. at 18 tbl. 2.1. 1995 World Health
Organization statistics rank the U.S. first in this age group, with twice the rate of the secondranked industrial nation. Id. It appears that high rates of black and Hispanic infanticide and
child homicide account for U.S. predominance in this area over other industrial nations that
may lack large poverty populations. Id. at 18 tbl. 2.1, 24.
83. Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1212-13 (provides this profile); see generally
Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 48 (exploring the links between female poverty and domestic
violence, both that which is inflicted by men on both women and children and that which is
inflicted by women on children).
84. The stories collected are those with child victims no older than twelve. The majority
of child victims were no more than five years old. Stories involving older children and
teenagers typically present distinct fact patterns, such as sexual assault and raging attacks
that may destroy an entire family.
85. See supra notes 77-78.
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NO. OF
ARTICLES
5

Cornelius, Tina Marie F
Diaz, Lisa
F

Mother
Mother

26
46

Disabella, Angela
Evans, Demetria

F
F

Mother
Mother

3
5

Garcia, Guadaulupe
Hamilton, Sharonda

F
F

Mother
Mother

4
18

Hampton, Tameika
F
Harris, Kimberly
F
Harrison, Lynette
F
Hernandez, Yesenia F
Huynh, Linda
F
Ivy, Amy
F
Katta, Nirmala
F
Kibble, Claudette
F
Laney, Deanna
F
Leija, Juana
F
Lewis, Ora
F
Maddux, Tracy
F
Medellin, Germaine
Janine
F
Moren, Jessica
F
Nzeakor, Stacy
F
Padron,
Yvonne
Nichole
F
Pearson, Samantha
F

Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother
Mother

8
9
2
14
5
9
10
22
85
11
11
2

Mother
Mother
Mother

7
2
16

Mother
Mother

4
5

Perez, Dee Etta
Peterkin, Ana Marie

F
F

Mother
Mother

13
5

Phipps, Karen
Pumphrey, Hope

F
F

Mother
Mother

5
11

Rodriguez, Evonne
F
Romero, Mary Isabel F

Mother
Mother

30
1
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Routier, Darlie

RELATIONSHIP
SEX TO VICTIM
F
Mother

NO. OF
ARTICLES
472

Schlosser, Dena
Smith, Lisa Marie

F
F

Mother
Mother

51
14

Tolliver, Hazel
Torres, Olga

F
F

Mother
Mother

3
9

Vernege, Loretta
Yates, Andrea

F
F

Mother
Mother

4
544

Zamorano, Angelita

F

Mother

1

Father

11

Boyfriend

14

Father
Father
Father
Father
Stepfather

1
2
75
16
5

Father
Father
Father
Stepfather
Father
Father of one victim
Father
Father
Father
Mom’s friend?
Father
Father

1
15
3
3
4
1
3
1
1
4
8
2

Adams,
Timothy
Wayne
M
Aguilera,
Jose
Guadalupe
M
Arocha,
Joe
Dominguez
M
Barnes, Patrick Nelson M
Battaglia, John
M
Bush, John
M
Carter Jr., Bobby Dale M
Decorats,
Phillippe
Fournier
M
Dehoyos, Danny
M
Duncum, Joe Ross
M
Gonzales, Jose
M
Guzman, Benito
M
Holiday, Raphael
M
Hughes, Melvin James M
Land III, Jesse Alvin M
Lopez, Leon Eric
M
Lugo, Francisco Javier M
Mabry, Tremaine
M
Maddux, Clayton
M

117
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NAME
Markley, Jerome

RELATIONSHIP
SEX TO VICTIM
M Father

NO. OF
ARTICLES
8

Moren, Bruce
Nakedhead, Tom

M
M

Father
Mom’s boyfriend

2
3

Nasir, Mohammad
Ochoa, Abel

M
M

Father
Father

6
15

Pierott, Kenneth
Pumphrey, Jason
Rodriguez
Raymond

M
M

Mom’s boyfriend
Stepfather

17
11

M

Father
7
Father of at least 2
victims
51
Father
17
Father
3
Stepfather
3

Jr.,

Rubio, John
M
Rumsey, Timothy
M
Savage, Michael
M
Skinner, Jon
M
Smallwood Jr.,
James D.
M
Tejeda, Jesus
M
Tejeda, Juan
M
Thornton II, James
M
Williams, Jeremy Fritz M

Father
Stepfather’s brother
Stepfather
Father
Father

4
9
14
16
5

The table provides the name, sex and relationship between victim and
accused in each case, as well as the number of times any of the three dailies
printed stories about the accused. 86 This survey suggests that the
homicides of poor child victims surface, then fade fairly quickly back into
the sea of misery from which they emanated, while stories about middle-

86. If an item appeared in more than one edition of a paper, it was counted only once.
An Associated Press item that appeared in more than one of the three newspapers was
counted as many as three times because the story was carried in a second or third news
market. Items appearing in the Round Up section of the San Antonio Express-News
covering out-of-area stories otherwise not covered in the newspaper were also counted.
Dallas Morning News briefs were counted if they were the unique mention of the item in the
newspaper for that day; Dallas Morning News “Quick” section stories were not counted.
Mentions in end-of-year brief summaries of notable stories were counted. Editorials were
counted, but letters to the editor were not. Because information about race was not available
for each man or woman, race is not indicated in the table.
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class women killers gain sustained attention. The stories about minority
child homicides that have legs are those with bizarre facts, such as the
south Texas case intimating witchcraft, spirit possession, and the ritual
killing of three children.87 The only story about a white male killer to rival
the level of coverage of white women killers involved the tale of an
accountant who shot his two children in an act of vengeance against an
estranged wife. 88 Poor white child killers of either sex are consigned to the
same oblivion as poor blacks and Hispanics. 89
If the protection of children were our primary concern, we would
concentrate attention on the conditions that produce severe child abuse and
the children who may be living at risk. 90 A sound child protection policy
would necessarily be directed at stemming the formation of high-risk
households by combating teen pregnancy and the truncated education of
girls living in poverty, and at promoting effective ameliorative services for
women with children struggling in these conditions.91 It would recognize
the roots of child homicide in child abuse and that child abuse is often part
and parcel of lives and households plagued by intra-family violence.92
Sound criminal law policy would certainly also accord mental health
defenses to mothers and fathers who kill their children in the grip of
psychosis and suicidal depression. 93 Equally, the implications for child
safety of severe mental illness in parents, whether postpartum or otherwise,
whether in mothers or fathers, would receive greater attention from
organized medicine and social service providers of all stripes.
87. Mariano Castillo, Dad’s Trial Delayed for Exam; Decapitation Suspect to See
Psychiatrist, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, at 1B (recounting some of the
bizarre facts in a treble homicide committed by John Allen Rubio and his common law wife
Angela Camacho).
88. Steve McGonigle, Trial Will Begin Monday for Man Accused of Killing Two
Daughters; Domestic Violence History, Mental Problems Among Issues, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 21, 2002, at 35A.
89. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85. Evonne
Rodriguez was the subject of the largest number of stories about killers not identified as
middle class. The stories about her are devoid of information about status, occupation, or
income. She was acquitted by reason of insanity for killing her four-month-old infant in
1997, but came in for a second round of coverage when she became pregnant again while
incarcerated at a state mental hospital. See, e.g., John Makeig, Mom Who Killed Infant Is
Pregnant Again; Woman in Custody Since 1997 Drowning, HOUS. CHRON., July 20, 1999, at
A13.
90. See Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1212-15; see generally Finkelhor, supra note
13.
91. See Overpeck et al., supra note 46, at 1215.
92. See generally Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 48.
93. The prominence of men and women so afflicted in the population who kill children
was brought to the fore thirty-five years ago in the much-cited work of Dr. Phillip Resnick.
See Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12.
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There are doubtless multiple, entwined causes or explanations for the
lack of efficacious child protection policies. The statistical concentration
of lethal child abuse among the poor 94 may enervate any sense of urgency
in the more fortunate strata of society. The sheer size of the impoverished
population, 95 and the limited resources made available to address the needs
of this population, may hobble effective policy and action. In Texas, for
example, scandal has rolled through a number of communities where child
protective services knew or should have known of children at risk who died
tragically at the hands of parents and caretakers.96 As with all varieties of
family violence, child abuse homicide does not arouse fear in the general
public of the sort that lead to persistent demands for attention to public
safely because the threat is perceived as confined to the family circle of the
abuser. 97 The brutal mother, father, or live-in boyfriend does not galvanize
fear about danger to the community at large as does, for example, the
pedophile lurking near the schoolyard or other criminal predator who is a
stranger to the victim. 98 Reluctance to pierce the veil of family privacy

94. See Finkelhor, supra note 13, at 25.
95. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that 12.7 percent of the population, or thirty-seven
million people were living in poverty in 2004. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 9 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
96. Texas newspapers are replete with articles about the failure of Child Protective
Services (CPS) to protect at-risk children. For example, a court-ordered report produced a
“scathing critique” of Child Protective Services in Bexar County. See Tom Bower, Child
Agency Urged to Partly Privatize; Programs to Recruit Foster Parents, Finalize Adoptions
Targeted, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 28, 2004, at 3B; see also Tom Bower,
Diamond’s Sad Legacy; Court-Ordered Report Rips Agency That Failed Little Girl, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 27, 2004, at 1A. In 2004, the Houston Chronicle reported
severely underfunded and overtaxed services state-wide. See Polly Ross Hughes, No Unity
on Fixing Children’s Services; Some Contend More Money Won’t Solve All Problems,
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2004, at A1. The Dallas Morning News reports the third high
profile case within a month of a child abuse fatality whose parents had had previous contact
with CPS. See Holly Yan, Girl, 5, Injured; 2 Held; Dallas Police Say Hospitalized Child
Showed Signs of Abuse, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 19, 2004, at 1B. At least since the
well-publicized case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489
U.S. 189 (1989), the public has been made aware that child protective services all over the
country are severely strained by their caseloads, and that the consequences can be tragic.
97. See, e.g., D. Seaborne Davies, Child-Killing in English Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 203,
221 (1937) (noting that in the policy debate before the 1866 Capital Punishment
Commission, some witnesses expressed Bentham’s point “that the killing of a child by its
mother did not create the same feeling of alarm in society as other forms of murder”); see
also NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: VOLUME I: THE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 128 (1968) (noting that Fitzjames Stephen was among those who took this
position before the Commission, arguing both that the infanticide “causes no [public] alarm,
because it is a crime committed only by mothers upon their newly born children”).
98. See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A
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with intrusive state regulation may play a role. While not gainsaying any
of these sources of inattention, I would like to make a case that the history
of the crime of infanticide is one in which the regulation of women, not the
protection of children, is the driving, constant element.
In pre-Christian Europe, infanticide was not a crime. 99 Early modern
Europe and England introduced infanticide legislation to regulate the
sexuality of the inferior classes and in particular the women of these
classes. 100 In the nineteenth century, the protection of children emerged as
Further, with the
a novel additional aim of such legislation. 101
normalization of the sentimental bourgeois family as at least the nominal
ideal for all classes in the modern state,102 the most charged figure in the
infanticide drama ceased to be the lewd working girl and instead became
the woman at the pinnacle of female status—the married, middle-class
mother. This figure debuted in the nineteenth century. The anxieties that
attach to infanticides by such women appear to have at least as much to do
with the protection of cherished views about motherhood as with the
protection of children.
II. THE HISTORY OF INFANTICIDE IN EUROPE, FOCUSING ON ENGLAND
A.

The Ancient World and the Modern State

Infanticide of newborns was not a crime in the law and custom of preChristian Europe. 103 A father as head of household had the privilege of
deciding whether to raise a child or allow the child to die.104 This was the
law of Greece and the law of Rome before her emperors embraced

Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1996)
(examining some issues surrounding the criminal law’s response to homicides with stranger
victims versus homicides with intimate partner victims that also arise in the arena of crimes
against children).
99. Kathryn L. Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1 ISSUES L. &
MED. 345, 349-51 (1986).
100. PETER C. HOFFER & N. E. H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1558-1803, at 11-25 (1981).
101. See George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical Opinion in
Mid-Victorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 403, 403-07 (1979).
102. See Susan Moller Okin, Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family, 11 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 65, 88 (1981).
103. See generally Carol J. Clover, The Politics of Scarcity: Notes on the Sex Ratio in
Early Scandinavia, 60 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 147 (1988) (on the law and practice of
infanticide in pagan Europe, arguing the practice was universal and took its largest toll on
female infants).
104. Moseley, supra note 99, at 349.
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Christianity in the fourth century A.D. 105 Infanticide was also lawfully
practiced in Europe before the Roman Conquest and among those
Europeans never subject to Roman control. 106 As in most other parts of the
world, Europeans practiced infanticide for many reasons including lack of
economic resources, 107 preference for male children,108 and out of a desire
to eliminate illegitimate children 109 and children thought to be the bringers
of misfortune. 110
Christianity followed Jewish law in forbidding infanticide.111
Constantine declared the erstwhile right of fathers to reject a child to be a
crime. 112 In due course, the church forbade infanticide throughout
Christian Europe. 113 The practice of infanticide of newborns, however,
remained vigorous for all the reasons that had fueled it prior to
Christianization despite church condemnation. 114 In the Europe of the
Middle Ages, the punishment of infanticide was, practically speaking, the
domain of the church as the regulator of family life.115 The “overlaying” or
smothering of infants sharing the family bed with their parents was the
most prominent and vexing problem the church combated. 116 Both man
and wife were subject to rebuke for overlaying. 117 In early modern Europe,
beginning in the sixteenth century, two profound, linked changes occurred
in the law of infanticide. Infanticide along with a great deal else that had
been regulated by the church became the business of the state.118 The
crime of infanticide was born, and defined as one committed by unmarried
women. 119 Thus, what had been a privilege of fathers became a crime of
105. Id. at 351-52.
106. Clover, supra note 103, at 162-64.
107. Moseley, supra note 99, at 349.
108. Id. at 351; see also Clover, supra note 103, at 160-62.
109. Moseley, supra note 99, at 351.
110. Id. at 345-46.
111. William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 353,
355 (1974).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id.; see Clover, supra note 103, at 164; Richard C. Trexler, Infanticide in Florence:
New Sources and First Results, 1 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 98, 99 (1974).
115. See generally Barbara A. Kellum, Infanticide in England in the Later Middle Ages, 1
HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 367 (1974) (on church practice and penances for infanticide); Trexler,
supra note 114.
116. See Langer, supra note 111, at 356; see also Kellum, supra note 115, at 369 (writing
that in the later Middle Ages “the three year penance for overlaying became standard”).
117. Trexler, supra note 114, at 108-09 (noting that in some places, the penance typically
was the public humiliation of acknowledging the sin).
118. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 11-12; Trexler, supra note 114, at 103, 105.
119. Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 259,
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unmarried mothers. 120
Early modern Europe experienced population growth and economic
change that pushed many out of agrarian life. 121 England and other
countries confronted a growing mobile population of the poor no longer
subject to village and church social control. 122 The more fortunate classes
were frightened by the unruliness and the perceived sexual license of the
poor, who were beyond the reach of traditional formal and informal
controls. 123 In this new dispensation there was little tolerance in the wage
economy for working women with illegitimate children.124 If a pregnant
woman could not or would not marry the father of her child, she could
expect to lose her current employment as well as her prospects of future
employment. 125 Her circumstances became dire; she could support neither
herself nor her child. 126 Moreover, the marriage prospects of the unmarried
mother who worked as a domestic servant or in the factory system were
inferior to those of her agrarian foremothers, in part because men of her
But more dramatically,
class were also economically insecure.127
generations of working women were systematically sexually exploited.128
Neither chastity nor marriage to the father of the child were options where
sexual access to working women was a privilege of social rank. This
formula—economic insecurity, sexual exploitation, and ostracism of the
fallen—put illegitimate children at risk of infanticide for hundreds of years.
The state responded to the perceived crisis—the growing menace to
social morality posed by the licentious poor—by regulating sexual conduct,
formerly the domain of the church, through the criminal law. In due
course, a punitive poor law regime was devised. 129 The parents of bastards
were fined. 130 Women who refused to name the father, and men who failed

259-60; see also Davies, supra note 97, at 213-14.
120. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 98, 101-107 (arguing that unmarried women
were the target of enforcement of infanticide law in England and the American colonies in
the early modern period).
121. Id. at 8, 12-13.
122. See id. at 12-13.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 115; see also Constance B. Backhouse, Desperate Women and
Compassionate Courts: Infanticide In Nineteenth Century Canada, 34 U. TORONTO L. J.
447, 448 (1984) (detailing similar settings in Canada).
125. See Behlmer, supra note 101, at 418.
126. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 115.
127. See id. at 13, 115.
128. See Langer, supra note 111, at 357; see also Backhouse, supra note 124, at 457.
129. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 11-17 (on the social changes that led to the Poor
Law of 1576, its provisions, and its impact).
130. Id. at 13.
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to support their illegitimate offspring, were subject to corporal punishment
and imprisonment. 131 In England—there were very similar laws on the
continent of Europe 132—the capstone of this regime was a 1623 statute
enacted by Parliament, the Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering
of Bastard Children, 133 which punished with death any unmarried
woman—styled a “lewd” woman—who concealed the death of her bastard
child. 134 Such concealment was to be punished “as murther” 135 regardless
of whether the child “were borne alive or not,” 136 unless the mother could
produce a witness that the child was stillborn. 137 Thus, the statute relieved
the prosecution of the burden of proving either that the defendant mother
had killed the child or even that the child was born alive. 138 It shifted the
burden to the defendant to prove stillbirth or face conviction.139
131. Id.
132. See Trexler, supra note 114, at 103.
133. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jac., c.
27, §§ 1-2 (Eng.)
“Whereas many lewd Women have been delivered of Bastard Children, to avoid
their Shame, and to escape punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the Death of
their Children, and after, if the Child be found dead, the said Women do alledge,
that the said Child was born dead; whereas it falleth out sometimes (although
hardly it is to be proved) that the said Child or Children were murthered by the
said Women, their lewd Mothers, or by their Assent or Procurement: For the
Preventing therefore of this great Mischief, be it enacted by the Authority of this
present Parliament, That if any Woman after One Month next ensuing the End of
this Session of Parliament be delivered of any Issue of her Body, Male or Female,
which being born alive, should by the Laws of this Realm be a Bastard, and that
she endeavour privately, either by drowning or secret burying thereof, or any other
Way, either by herself or the procuring of others, so to conceal the Death thereof,
as that it may not come to Light, whether it were born alive or not, but be
concealed: In every such Case the said Mother so offending shall suffer Death as
in Case of Murther, except such Mother can make Proof by One Witness at the
least, that the Child (whose Death was by her so intended to be concealed) was
born dead.”.
134. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, §1.
135. Id. §2
136. Id. §2. The state would have been at a grave disadvantage from a forensic point of
view in proving a live birth with the scientific resources of the time, but for the unusual
advantage conveyed by the statute of not having to prove that the child was born alive. The
state would have had been unable to discharge the standard burden under the law of
homicide of a live birth in an many infanticide cases, absent a witness. See Behlmer, supra
note 101, at 410; Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 11-12. To this day, the
difficulty of such determinations hampers infanticide prosecutions of newborns and infants.
See Jennie Lusk, Modern New Mexican Neonaticide: Tranquilizing with This Jewel/The
Torments of Confusion, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 93, 110 (2001).
137. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, §2; see also
O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 259.
138. See O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 259.
139. See id.
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Notwithstanding this regime, high rates of infanticide of both legitimate
and illegitimate children persisted because the social causes of infanticide
endured. 140 The targets of vigorous prosecution, however, were the unwed
mothers. 141 Infanticide—or the concealment of a shameful and criminal
bastard stillbirth—was treated as a capital crime when practiced by
unmarried women of the working classes. Concurrently, the state for the
most part respected the privacy of married people to make decisions about
family size and composition in accord with the ancient privilege, now more
discreetly exercised than in the pre-Christian era.
During the seventeenth century, women were indeed executed in
England for the murder or concealment of their dead bastard children. 142
This ferocity began abating by the end of the seventeenth century;143
thereafter, judges and juries proved ever more unwilling to impose the full
rigor of the statute upon desperate girls, left to pay the piper by libertines
and absconding lovers. 144 The 1623 Act provided only one means for a
woman who had concealed the death of her illegitimate child to escape
execution. If she could come forward with a witness that the child was
For the next two centuries the
stillborn, she was discharged. 145
development of non-statutory defenses and finally statutory reforms
checked the execution of mothers of illegitimate children. 146 A number of
defenses evolved that spared women whom eighteenth century juries were
unwilling to hang. 147 The availability of these defenses diminished the
advantages to the state of prosecuting under the 1623 Act. The rules
governing an infanticide prosecution came to resemble in practice an
ordinary homicide prosecution in that the crown was obliged to persuade
the jury that the defendant acted with premeditation or at least intent to
destroy her living child.
Some women pleaded “benefit-of-linen,” meaning that they had

140. See Langer, supra note 111, at 355-57.
141. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 22-25 (noting a dramatic increase in both
prosecutions and convictions of mothers of bastards after the passage of the 1623 statute,
and the animus against female promiscuity).
142. See id. at 24-26.
143. Id. at 65, 71.
144. See Behlmer, supra note 101, at 410-13 (on the science of determining live birth in
the eighteenth century); see generally Davies, supra note 97 (on the history of English law
of infanticide child homicide).
145. Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jac., c.
27, §§ 1-2 (Eng.).
146. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 65-66; Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note
5, at 11-14; see also Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412 (the last execution of a women for
infanticide in England occurred in 1849).
147. See Oberman, Mothers Who Kill, supra note 5, at 14.
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prepared to take care of their babies by making or buying linen.148 If
credited, this defense established that the mother expected to accept the
child and to care for it. Women also pleaded “want-of-help,” meaning that
they were unable because of unforeseen adversity to obtain the help of a
midwife or others. 149 They also defended themselves on the grounds that
their baby’s death was an accident due to their ignorance or incapacitating
weakness during childbirth. 150 Women could defend themselves on the
grounds that they were temporarily insane, which was effective if they
could also successfully assert benefit of linen. 151 In addition to the
development of defenses that relied on lack of premeditation or intent, the
burden of proving that the child was born alive was in practice shifted back
to the prosecution. 152 These dilutions of the infanticide statute were
sometimes convenient pegs for outright nullification by juries and judges
who were unprepared to expose even women they believed guilty of
deliberate destruction of their illegitimate offspring to capital
punishment. 153 The 1623 law aimed to punish female transgression by
making women pay dearly for their sexual immorality; when that punitive,
ostracizing impulse was spent, the English jury no longer saw a shameless
strumpet in the dock but a desperate girl caught in a shameless system.154
It appears that infanticide itself, absent the need to smite fallen women, was
insufficient to warrant such severe treatment in the eyes of the eighteenth
century English public. 155 As antagonism to working class female sexual
transgression abated, pressure for reform of the 1623 statute mounted; Lord
Ellenborough’s Act of 1803 repealed the 1623 statute.156
Some reformers were motivated by the harshness of the infanticide
laws, 157 but others were motivated by anxiety that the law’s majesty
suffered from the blatant gap between the draconian 1623 law and the
nullifying verdicts rendered by jurors with the tacit support of the bench.158
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 260 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *198).
153. See Davies, supra note 97, at 213-23. In time, juries would not convict, and judges
would not sentence to death, and the crown would commute rather than execute if there
were a conviction. Id.
154. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 67-71.
155. See id. at 71.
156. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 3 (Eng.).
157. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at 86-87.
158. Id. at 87 (noting that the reform bill’s author, Lord Ellenborough, was motivated by
such nullifying tendencies); see also Davies, supra note 97, at 214.
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After 1803, the burden of proving live birth was lodged with the
prosecution, eliminating that singular advantage the prosecution enjoyed
under the seventeenth century statute. But in another respect, a special
regime for the punishment of mothers of bastards was retained. Under the
1803 Act, the mother of a bastard tried for infanticide, if acquitted, could
be convicted of a lesser charge, the misdemeanor of concealment of birth,
punishable by up two years imprisonment. 159 In 1828, however, an act of
Parliament reformed the law so that all women, including married women,
were equally prosecutable for the crime of concealment. 160
The 1828 legislation marks a sea change in the history of infanticide
law. Henceforward, the respectable married woman and the mother of a
bastard were subject to the same de jure regime, aimed at protecting child
life and punishing transgressive mothers. There are at least two possible
explanations for this equalization of susceptibility of all women—at least
de jure—to investigation, regulation, and punishment. It has been observed
that nineteenth century British elites were becoming more invested in
children and their welfare than their predecessors had been.161 A second
related explanation is that as child welfare became a more prominent
concern, alongside the deplorable sexual morals of the lower classes, the
hypocrisy of categorically exempting the respectable from prosecution
became blatant. 162 I propose a third explanation, a complement to those of
the enhanced status of children and dawning awareness of hypocrisy: a
heightened preoccupation with the maternal role against which the virtue of
the female sex was increasingly to be measured.163
The moral meaning and emotional charge of the crime of infanticide
evolved over the course of several hundred years. In the seventeenth
century, infanticide legislation and prosecutions were responsive to anxiety
about and hostility towards female sexual transgression. In the nineteenth
century, anxiety about women deviating from motherhood norms came to
the fore, although such concerns did not entirely displace those about
female sexual decorum. In the seventeenth century juries were at least
sometimes willing to hang a bad girl whose execution under the 1623
statute did not require proof that she had actually killed her child. In the
course of the eighteenth century, juries became increasingly sympathetic to

159. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, §§ 3-4.
160. Offences Against the Person Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, §§ 1, 14 (Eng.).
161. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 403-07.
162. See Langer, supra note 111, at 360 (“By the mid-century the matter [of infanticide]
had become one of public scandal.”).
163. See generally Moller Okin, supra note 102, who wrote about the emergence of the
maternal ideal in the weave of female virtue in the bourgeois family.
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the plight of desperate, unwed working women. In contrast, the figure that
most engages the contemporary public is the married woman who commits
infanticide. Every trial as well as every decision about whether to
prosecute or divert confronts the question, “Is she mad or bad?” 164 In the
United States, both explanations are possible. In Great Britain, the law has
normalized a pathological view of maternal infanticide. 165 In the United
States, we have neither elected to follow this path nor to reject it.
We in the United States have not followed the British in their
pathological turn; we do not treat maternal infanticide as biological defect,
medically excused as a matter of law. Nonetheless, I suggest that
biologically-based disorder, whether triggered by the processes of birth
itself, as with postpartum psychosis present in the Yates case,166 or other
deep-seated disease, such as severe depression, as in the Susan Smith
case, 167 is the preferred explanation, and the most comforting explanation,
in the United States as well. It is more soothing to the anxiety about female
compliance with mothering norms to see infanticide as the product of
disease, biological failure, than of moral failure. While a punitive reaction
can be cathartic and can allay anxiety, concluding that, for example,
Andrea Yates is a very sick woman offers far more relief. 168 It is better to
learn that from time to time that maternal instinct and commitment are
overwhelmed by terrifying illnesses than that they are too casually
implanted to resist conventional temptations, such as money, ease, and
romance.
B.

British Infanticide Law in the Twentieth and Twenty-First
Centuries

It is instructive to consider the history of pathologizing infanticide in
Britain. It appears that during the life of the 1623 Act, some women
charged with infanticide were found to be insane. 169 There were also
seventeenth and eighteenth century instances of married child murderesses

164. See generally Wilczynski, supra note 5.
165. See Mackay, supra note 6, at 29; see also WALKER, supra note 97, at 133 (noting
that between 1961 and 1965, nine out of ten women convicted of infanticide were “either
committed to mental hospitals or put on probation”).
166. Denno, supra note 5, at 26-36.
167. Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51.
168. One veteran psychiatrist who had treated Yates in 1999 testified that she considered
Yates “among the five sickest people” she had ever treated. Carol Christian, Doctor: Yates’
Illness Severe; Did Not Know Actions Were Wrong, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.
169. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412-13; see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 100, at
146-50.
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being excused due to insanity. 170 However, it was not until the nineteenth
century that infanticide became deeply entwined with the insanity
question. 171 Interestingly, this fusion or conjuncture occurred at the
historical moment in which married women became susceptible to
prosecution for concealment. In Great Britain both the desperate girl and
the married mum have benefited from the pathological turn. Both today
receive a form of medical diversion.
The British have had an infanticide statute since 1922 under which
postpartum disturbance is at least a partial defense to a charge of
infanticidal murder, reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter.172
In 1938 the statue was amended to set the limit of its application to children
under a year old; 173 to accomplish or rationalize this extension, “effect of
lactation” was included in the revised statute as a ground of mental
disturbance in mothers. 174 This overcame the otherwise awkward fact that
postpartum illness waxes immediately upon birth and in the great majority
of cases is very short-lived. 175 The reform made clear that, henceforth,
mothers of older infants were to be shielded from murder indictments.
That science has not found a connection between mental illness and
lactation has apparently not proved an impediment to the operation of this
statutory regime. The 1938 statute has been interpreted in practice to
permit virtually any woman who kills her child less than one year old to
have the benefit of the partial defense regardless of her actual mental
condition. 176 In Britain, infanticidal mothers are constructively mad;177 no
170. See WALKER, supra note 97, at 127.
171. Behlmer, supra note 101, at 412-14 (tracing the roots in Victorian medicine of the
notion, later enshrined in English statutes, that new mothers are subject to forms of
temporary insanity, such as “puerperal mania” and “lactational insanity”).
172. Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1 (Eng.) (reading, in part, “[w]here a
woman . . . causes the death of her newly-born child, but at the time of the act or omission
she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason
thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed . . .” the infanticide offense will be
reduced from murder to manslaughter).
173. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.); see O’Donovan, supra note
119, at 261-63 (discussing the motivation for amending the act).
174. O’Donovan, supra note 119, at 261-62. The stimulus for the reform was the case R
v. O’Donoghue, (1927) 20 Cr. App. R 132. See id. at 262. The 1922 statute was silent on
the maximum age of a child whose mother could find shelter under the statute. Id. at 261.
In O’Donoghue, the judge ruled that the age of her child, thirty-five days, put her outside the
protection of the statute. Id. at 262.
175. Amy L. Nelson, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK. L. REV. 625, 634
(1991).
176. Mackay, supra note 6, at 29. The effect of an infanticide charge under the 1938 Act
is that the prosecution concedes mental disturbance and thus the defendant need not prove it,
nor does the jury consider medical evidence. Id.
177. Ania Wilczynski & Allison Morris, Parents Who Kill Their Children, 1993 CRIM. L.
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serious proof of mental illness or that mental illness caused the crime is
required.
Contemporary Britain has moved further in the direction of medicalizing
maternal infanticide since 1938. 178 In the 1970s, reformers attempted to
amend the law once again in order to recognize explicitly social stressors of
motherhood, in addition to biologically-based, childbearing-related
disorders as grounds for reduction of charge from murder to
manslaughter. 179 This initiative did not bear fruit despite the fact that, de
facto, social factors are accepted as sufficient to warrant diversion or
mitigation in British cases.180 British mothers convicted of killing infants,
and to a lesser but marked extent young children,181 are not sent to prison
but instead are required to undergo hospital or outpatient treatment.182
The British have settled law and policy, a canonical answer to the
question of whether the mother who kills her child is mad or bad. Legal
doctrine in the United States, in contrast, is not liberal in excusing, or
partially excusing, mothers who kill; it has been justly criticized for failing
to accord mental health defenses reliably to mothers suffering from
postpartum psychosis and other grave disorders. Yet, we, like the British,
are preoccupied with the question of maternal dysfunction to the detriment
of a more comprehensive approach to child homicide.
A more
comprehensive approach would hark back to Resnick’s pioneering work.
Recall that Resnick found a high incidences of serious mental disorders in
both men and women child killers and recognized the prominence of
childabuse as a cause of homicide of children. 183
Despite the relative lack of formal, doctrinal support for mental health
defenses for mothers who kill children in the United States, an examination
REV. 31, 35 (“[R]esearch shows that about half of the women who plead guilty to or are
convicted of infanticide are not suffering from any identifiable mental disorder at all.”).
178. WALKER, supra note 97, at 133 (reporting that by the early 1960s, out of seventytwo women guilty of infanticide, only one was sent to prison, and for a term of six months
or less).
179. See Mackay, supra note 6, at 21.
180. See Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 177, at 35.
181. Id. at 33-34; see also Mackay, supra note 6, at 29 (noting that women who killed
children older than twelve months, if not subject to medical diversion, could escape murder
prosecution or conviction by the reduction of charge to diminished capacity manslaughter
and related mitigations).
182. Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 177, at 34 (reporting that between 1982 and 1989,
only nine percent of women suspected of child homicide were imprisoned, almost half were
made subject to hospital orders, and more than two-fifths were given probation orders); see
also Ania Wilczynski, Mad or Bad? Child-Killers, Gender and the Courts, 37 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 419, 422 (1997) (a more recent study of forty-eight cases, reporting that 87.5
percent of filicidal women received hospital orders or non-custodial supervisory sentences).
183. See Resnick, Child Murder, supra note 12, at 328-33.
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of a few well-known cases suggests that the trials of women who kill turn
upon whether their lawyers can successfully deploy what I will call “the
Good Mother Defense.”
III. THE GOOD MOTHER DEFENSE
The Good Mother Defense is not a recognized complete defense but
rather a strategy for achieving the best practicable result, whether it is
acquittal or diminution of the level of offense or mitigation of punishment.
It may work in tandem with an insanity defense, and is in fact a species of
mental health defense. The Good Mother Defense trades on the tendency
of jurors to find madness or something akin to it the most plausible, and
least unsettling, explanation for the death of a child at the hands of a
virtuous woman.
The insanity defense is rarely used and unlikely to succeed, despite
popular beliefs to the contrary. 184 Infanticidal mothers seem to fare slightly
better than other defendants who pursue insanity acquittals. 185 Yet mental
illness, and the question—”Was she mad?”—permeates cases where an
insanity plea is not even entered. Whenever the prosecution in a maternal
infanticide or child homicide case is in the unenviable position of lacking a
plausible motive, where such comprehensible motives as greed, revenge, or
a pattern of brutality towards the victim are apparently absent, the
prosecution confronts the disposition to find in madness an explanation—or
explanation for the lack of explanation—of the anomaly of a mother killing
her child. Mental illness therefore functions as a defense in such cases in
an informal, or de facto, and expanded sense: mental illness provides the
basis for a bid to avoid prosecution, lessen the severity of the offense
charged or the offense of conviction, or mitigate punishment. 186
In notorious cases, prosecutors may insist on trials and pursue severe
punishments even in the face of powerful evidence of mental illness.
Prosecutors may act out of deference to the perceived demand that these

184. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 188 (2d ed. 1997)
(estimates from a number of states put the successful rate of insanity pleas at approximately
twenty-five percent); see also Denno, supra note 5, at 11 & n.87.
185. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 193 (1994)
(there is some evidence that infanticidal mothers fare somewhat better than other insanity
defendants); Michael Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1421 n.309 (1997).
186. The Juana Leija case, discussed supra note 37, is an example of a case that is well
known in Houston, where prosecutors accepted a plea bargain for a probationary sentence,
either from compassion or to avoid an insanity acquittal.
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killer mothers be subjected to public justice187 or because a trial presents an
attractive platform for their own ambitions.188 Most infanticides by parents
do not present these pressures or opportunities because they fail to attract
sustained public attention. They may surface in the local newspaper and
disappear after a few sparse stories about the tragic or sordid act of child
killing, without benefit of a follow-up story recounting the legal disposition
of the case. 189 The ideal candidate for notorious infanticide case status is a
married, middle-class white woman. 190 It is the failure of these mothers to
protect and nurture their children that is grist for the media mill and public
fascination. 191 Mentally ill fathers do not fascinate.192 Infanticides in
deficient, irregular households—that is to say, children assaulted by single
mothers living in poverty, or by their boyfriends—do not fascinate.193
Although rates of infanticide among blacks are high, 194 nor do black
mothers who kill fascinate. 195 It is those who are perceived to be at the
pinnacle of the female hierarchy, who set the standards of motherhood
against which others are found wanting, who fascinate when they fall from
these heights. 196 In these cases, prosecutors and the public wrestle with an
acute version of the question of infanticide: how could she, sustained as she
is by the race, class, and marital characteristics that define female
excellence, fail so spectacularly at motherhood, the paramount expression
of female excellence? Such women are candidates for the Good Mother
Defense.
The Good Mother Defense is a defense strategy, not a formal plea or
legally recognized defense. The idea is, when confronted with a good

187. Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, Harris County Assistant Dist. Attorney, in
Houston, Tex. (Dec. 30, 2002). For example, Joe Owmby, the Harris County assistant
district attorney who led the prosecution of Yates, believes that in a notorious case such as
Yates the public demands a trial, and that therefore a prosecutor must present the case to a
jury. Id.
188. See Rick Bragg, Keeping Mother’s Trial in Hometown Could be Crucial, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1995, at A18 [hereinafter Bragg, Trial in Hometown]; Verdict Gets Mixed
Reaction in Union, HERALD-JOURNAL (Spartanburg, S.C.), July, 29, 1995.
189. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85, and text
accompanying notes 86-89.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See BJS, INFANTICIDE, supra note 11. The rate of homicide of black children under
the age of five, although in decline since the late 1990s, remains at least three times as high
as the rate for white children. See id.; see also supra note 82.
195. See Table: Child Homicide in the Texas Press 1993-2005, supra note 85, and text
accompanying notes 86-89.
196. See id.
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mother in the dock, a jury will find mitigation in madness. In a capital case
(an eventuality rendered much more likely if there is more than one
victim) 197 the best achievable outcome may be life imprisonment. The
good mother defense trades on the disposition to accept that a woman who
kills her children, if a good mother, is mad even if she cannot qualify for
the stringently defined insanity defense. But deployment of the defense
must contend with standards for “the good mother” that may defeat
otherwise apt defendants. 198 The defense is therefore parlous for both the
defendant and the state. Let us examine the operation of this defense in
three notorious capital cases, two of which achieved national and
international notoriety—those of Susan Smith and Andrea Yates—and a
Dallas case notorious in Texas, that of Darlie Routier. Yates and Smith
admitted killing their children while Routier denied she had done so. The
Yates and Smith cases resulted in life sentences; Darlie Routier is on death
row.
Andrea Yates and Susan Smith
In 2001, Andrea Yates methodically drowned all five of her children in
the bathtub of her suburban Houston home in the span of an hour; the
youngest child was six months old and the oldest was seven years old. 199
Andrea Yates, a college-educated nurse 200 and the wife of a NASA
engineer, 201 was a stay-at-home mom. 202 She was, at the time of her
crimes, and at the time of her trial, severely mentally ill,203 although just
how mentally ill was disputed.204 The decision to prosecute Yates was
severely criticized by mental health and feminist advocates who called
attention to her grave mental condition. 205 The state justified prosecution
by appealing both to the enormity of the crime and the deterrent value of
197. SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 45-50 (1989) (finding that the circumstance of multiple
victims was most heavily correlated with a capital sentence).
198. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
199. Mike Glenn et al., Mom of 5: “I Killed My Kids;” Children May Have Died in Tub,
HOUS. CHRON., June 21, 2001, at A1.
200. See Denno, supra note 5, at 7-8 (providing Yates’ life history).
201. S. K. Bardwell et al., Mom Details Drownings of 5 Kids, HOUS. CHRON., June 22,
2001, at A1.
202. Id.
203. Denno, supra note 5, at 27-34 (reprising Andrea Yates’ mental health history).
204. Most notably, Yates’ degree of mental illness was disputed by the state’s psychiatric
expert, Dr. Park Dietz. See id. at 37-47 (providing painstaking exposition and critique of
Dietz’ contribution to the Yates case).
205. Lisa Teachey, Several Groups Rally Behind Drive to Assist Yates, HOUS. CHRON.,
Aug. 28, 2001, at A15.

RAPAPORT_CHRISTENSEN

134

2/3/2011 10:15 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

conviction. 206 The state maintained that although concededly mentally ill,
Yates was legally sane under Texas law, and she was therefore morally
responsible for her actions. 207 The case presented dueling mental health
experts, most notably Parks Dietz for the prosecution, and Philip Resnick
for the defense. 208 The trial revealed horrifying details of a very sick
woman sinking in the midst of her unresponsive family and ineffective
medical intervention.209 Treating psychiatrists and expert witnesses for
both state and defense told the painful story: the suicide attempts, the
postpartum psychosis, the warnings that such psychosis might return with
her last pregnancy. 210 Andrea Yates testified that although she planned the
killing of her children, she did it because the children were not “developing
correctly” 211 and would be damned as a consequence if they lived to
adulthood, 212 and that this was her fault because she was not a good
mother. 213 She also told several psychiatrists that she was possessed by the
devil and heard satanic voices in her head telling her to kill the children. 214
In 1994, Susan Smith strapped her fourteen-month-old and three-yearold sons into their car seats and sent the car plunging down a ramp into a
lake near her small-town South Carolina home. 215 Smith precipitated her
notoriety by broadcasting pleas for the safe return of her two children,

206. Carol Christian & Lisa Teachey, Yates Found Guilty; Jury Takes 3 ½ Hours to
Convict Mother in Children’s Deaths, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at A1 (“[Prosecutor]
Owmby began the closings by saying Yates should be convicted as a deterrent to similar
crimes.”).
207. Denno, supra note 5, at 37-47. This was the substance of Dr. Dietz’s testimony. Id.
208. Id. at 47-49 (Denno recounts the perspective of the defense psychiatrists, most
prominent among whom was Dr. Philip Resnick. Resnick described Yates’ motives as
“‘altruistic,’ . . . that she believed that she was sending her children to heaven and, in setting
herself up for execution, ridding the world of Satan.”).
209. Carol Christian, Witness Tracked Decline of Yates; Friend Testifies on Lack of Care,
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 1, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter Christian, Witness Tracked Decline].
Debbie Holmes, a former nurse colleague and close friend of Yates, gave revealing and
affecting testimony. Holmes repeatedly begged Rusty Yates, Andrea’s husband, to seek
medical help. Holmes describes Yates in the weeks before the homicides as virtually mute,
expressionless, increasingly thin and thus “looked like a cancer patient,” not bathing and,
wandering aimlessly through the house, and being inattentive to her children. Id.
210. See Denno, supra note 5, at 27-34, 37-49.
211. Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Confession, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 21, 2002,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/drownings/1266294.html.
212. See Christian, Witness Tracked Decline, supra note 209.
213. Transcript of Andrea Yates’ Confession, supra note 211.
214. Denno, supra note 5, at 37-38, 47-48.
215. Rick Bragg, Police Say Woman Admits to Killings as Bodies of 2 Children Are
Found Inside Her Car, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A1 [hereinafter Bragg, Woman Admits
to Killings].
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whom she claimed were taken by a black carjacker. 216 Nine days later she
confessed that the black man was pure invention and that she had drowned
her children. 217 She was excoriated as a scheming liar who cannily
exploited American racism to deflect blame. 218
Smith was a married woman in the process of divorcing her husband. 219
Her class position is ambiguous. Her parents were blue collar, 220 but her
mother married a local notable.221 She was a high school graduate222 and a
secretary. 223 Her husband was an assistant manager at a Winn Dixie
supermarket. 224
The state’s case against Smith was that she killed her children to
improve her romantic chances with a lover who rejected her because he did
not wish to take on the role of stepfather of another man’s children.225
Smith’s lawyers kept the prosecution and an avid public guessing about
whether an insanity plea would be entered, 226 thus raising the issue of her
mental condition, but in the end she did not enter an insanity plea.227 But
there were many dramatic revelations about Susan Smith that turned an
antagonistic hometown public mortified by her notoriety and horrified by
her crimes into staunch opponents of capital punishment.228 Susan Smith,
in the hands of her able defense attorneys, morphed from a promiscuous
schemer into a childlike victim whose overburdened psyche could not bear
the weight of the injustices life had heaped on her fragile young

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Ronald Smothers, Town, Feeling Betrayed, Reviles Woman Accused of Killing Sons,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, §1, at 1.
219. Bragg, Woman Admits to Killings, supra note 215.
220. Rick Bragg, Life of a Mother Accused of Killing Offers No Clues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 1994, §1, at 1 [hereinafter Bragg, Life of a Mother].
221. Id.; see also Report: Susan Smith Reported Stepfather for Sexual Molestation,
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Nov. 27, 1994, at 3B (describing stepfather Beverley Russell as a
stockbroker and tax consultant, Republican state executive committeeman, and a member of
the advisory board of the Christian Coalition).
222. Bragg, Life of a Mother, supra note 220.
223. Rick Bragg, Insanity Plea Expected in Boys’ Drownings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994,
at A18 (“Her $17,000 salary as a secretary . . . was augmented by child support. In a mill
town in the Deep South, $17,000 a year is middle class.”).
224. Bragg, Woman Admits to Killings, supra note 215.
225. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
226. See Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51; Rick Bragg, Prosecutor of Susan Smith
Offers a Small Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1995, §1, at 6 [hereinafter Bragg,
Prosecutor of Susan Smith].
227. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
228. Bragg, Trial in Hometown, supra note 188 (describing Union, South Carolina
residents as at first viewing Susan as “evil incarnate”).
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shoulders. 229
The facts that emerged were sordid, but in the end produced
sympathy. 230 Her husband was unfaithful. 231 Her stepfather had molested
her. 232 Her wealthy boyfriend spurned her because she lacked the breeding
and education he wanted in a wife.233 She had a history of depression.234
The defense theory of the case was that Susan Smith drowned her children
not with premeditation or even intentionally, but in a swirl of “suicidal
confusion.” 235 Smith, the defense argued, was in crisis; her chronic
depression had progressed to an acutely suicidal pitch. 236
During the penalty phase of both trials, prosecutors were faced with a
motive deficit in asking their juries to believe that these women were
among the worst of the worst—murderers who deserved death. The Smith
case is even more instructive than the Yates case in highlighting the
difficulty a prosecutor can face in prosecuting infanticides.
The
237
was a self-centered
prosecutors in the Smith case argued that Smith
woman who found her children burdensome. The state portrayed the
defendant as seeking to improve her romantic and marital prospects by
disencumbering herself of her young sons. 238 These accusations, however,
suffered from a banal lack of heft as an explanation of child murder. The
Yates prosecution contended with the fact that not a scintilla of evidence of
the slightest disreputable conduct on Yates’ part at home or abroad—
excepting, of course, the murder of her children—had been put in evidence

229. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53. From their opening the defense portrayed
Susan Smith as “child-like and overwhelmed by depression.” Id.
230. Rick Bragg, Susan Smith Verdict Brings Relief to Town, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995,
§1, at 16.
231. Twila Decker & Cliff LeBlanc, Smith Divorce May Fuel Trial; Prosecution and
Defense Mine Infidelity Evidence, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 15, 1995, at A1.
232. Mother Held in Killings Was Abused, Papers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at
A14.
233. Rick Bragg, Smith Jury Hears of 2 Little Bodies, and a Letter, in the Lake, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 1995, at A16 [hereinafter Bragg, Smith Jury]. Tom Findlay rejected Smith
both because he did not want her ready-made family and because her mill worker
background made her an unsuitable mate for one in his privileged status. See id.
234. Bragg, Mother’s Defense, supra note 51.
235. Al Dozier, Smith Courtroom Drama Begins, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), July 19,
1995, at 18A (quoting defense attorney Judy Clarke).
236. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
237. Id. The prosecution portrayed Smith as a “selfish, malicious killer who sacrificed
her children for the love of the son of a rich industrialist.” Id.; see also Defense May Use
Abuse Claim, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), May 20, 1995, at 3B (reporting that the state will
portray Smith “as a self-centered schemer who used sex to manipulate men, and who killed
her children because she felt they were getting in the way”).
238. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
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or alleged in media reports. 239
Neither the Smith or the Yates prosecution was able to dispute copious
testimony that, bracketing the admitted fact that each had killed her
children, each was a good mother—a doting mother in Smith’s case,240 and
a consummately dutiful mother in Yates’ case.241 The enormity of their
crimes defies the explanation that a sane woman chafing at the demands of
motherhood would resolve her unhappiness by slaughtering her children.
The banality of the prosecution’s human or motivational explanation could
not withstand the comfort-giving polysyllogism that the defense strives to
evoke in the jury:
Susan loved her children.
[Therefore] Susan would not harm them.
[Therefore] she must have been crazy.

Darlie Routier
In 1996, Darin Routier awakened to screams and cries for help from his
wife Darlie. 242 He bolted down the stairs of his suburban Dallas home to
find two of his three sons, aged five and six, dying from stab wounds.243
His wife had also been stabbed; 244 she said she and the boys were attacked
by an intruder as they lay sleeping in the family’s first floor living room.245
Darlie was in due course charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for the

239. Prosecutor Joe Owmby expressed frustration with his inability to find evidence that
would support his own intuition that Andrea Yates coveted a more comfortable, less
demanding life. Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, supra note 187. At trial,
prosecutors had asked for a capital conviction on the grounds that there was deterrence
value in convicting the mentally ill but legally sane defendant. Prosecutor Williford said in
closing at the guilt and innocence phase of the trial, “To find her not guilty by reason of
insanity is to say that we no longer have self-accountability in our society.” Christian &
Teachey, supra note 206. At the penalty phase of the trial, prosecutors did not press for the
death penalty. Carol Christian, Jury Gives Yates Life Term with No Parole for 40 Years,
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2002, at A1. Prosecutor Joe Owmby believes it was right to
prosecute capitally, to ask the jury to decide between life and death, and for the jury to opt
for life. Telephone Interview with Joe Owmby, supra note 187.
240. Rick Bragg, Smith Defense Portrays Life of ‘Chaos,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at
A14.
241. Yates, a competitive swimmer and excellent student, gave up a career in nursing to
marry Russell Yates. She became a stay-at-home, home-schooling mom in submission to
her husband and their common fundamentalist faith. See Denno, supra note 5, at 7-8, 31.
242. Michael Saul, Kin Relate Account of Rowlett Slayings; 5-Year-Olds Cries Saved
Mom, Relative Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1996, at 19A [hereinafter Saul, Kin
Relate Account].
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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murder of five-year-old Damon. 246 Darlie Routier has never admitted
guilt. 247 Trauma-induced memory loss, she claims, has severely limited
her recall of the attack. 248 Her husband 249 and family have vehemently
defended her, 250 denying that so good a person and loving a mother could
harm her children.
Before the commencement of the trial, the state of Texas knew the
Routier family intimately. Darlie and Darin Routier were young—twentysix and twenty-eight respectively—when the murders took place. 251 They
had small town, blue-collar antecedents.252 They had been married for
eight years 253 and had three children,254 the youngest of which, eightmonth-old Drake 255 slept unharmed through the attack on his brothers, as
did his father. 256 Darin owned a successful small business. 257 After the
birth of their third child, Darlie stayed home with the children in their
lavish suburban Dallas home. 258 The young couple was extravagant.259
They were generous neighbors, 260 open-handed and brash in their
enjoyment of their early success. 261 As a result of their free spending, they
were badly in debt. 262 Darlie’s family was stout, even belligerent, in her
246. She was tried capitally for the murder of the younger of the two dead boys; the
aggravating factor elevating to a capital charge being death of a child under six. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in 2003. See Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 557
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
247. How the Case Against Darlie Routier Unfolded, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 2,
1997, at 32A [hereinafter Case Unfolded].
248. Id.
249. Id. For example, Darin Routier proclaimed that his love for his wife had grown
since their sons’ death. Id.
250. Prosecutor Admits He Lost His Cool, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 26, 1997, at 2. So
relentless were Routier’s family that a frustrated Dallas County assistant district attorney
called the heckling family “trailer trash” on camera during the trial during an interview
outside the courtroom. Id.
251. Michael Saul, Parents are Left Looking for Answers; Rowlett Couple Speak About
Boys’ Slayings, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 15, 1996, at 1A.
252. Barbara Kessler & Jason Siskles, Rowlett Police Detail Evidence in Slayings,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 20, 1996, at 1A.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Saul, Kin Relate Account, supra note 242.
257. Kessler & Siskles, supra note 252.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Douglas Holt, Mother’s Arrest Relieves, Shocks Rowlett Residents, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 19, 1996, at 1A.
261. See Kessler & Siskles, supra note 252.
262. A Rowlett Mother Accused of Killing Two of Her Sons Remained Jailed, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 6, 1996, at 5B.
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defense: so good a mother could not have killed her children.263 Texas was
also treated to some salacious tidbits about Darlie Routier. She was a
flashy dresser, 264 had breast implants,265 body piercings 266 and tattoos,267
and frequented with her girlfriends a club featuring male strippers. 268
“Trashy” Darlie media accounts and testimony would multiply at the
trial. 269
The state’s theory of the case was that selfish, 270 vain, 271 and
materialistic 272 Darlie had grown weary of the demands of being at home
with three small children, 273 angry about the realities of the family’s
worsening financial position, 274 and angry also at her inability to lose the
weight she had but on with her third pregnancy. 275 She had therefore killed
her children to relieve the drain on financial resources and the irksome
labor of caring for the boys. 276
Fearing that pre-trial publicity has poisoned the Dallas County jury pool,
Routier’s court appointed attorneys secured a change of venue to the small
town of Kerrville southwest of Dallas. 277 The Routiers hired a prominent
Dallas defense attorney 278 to supplant the publicly-appointed lawyers who
263. For example, see Steve Scott, Routier Relatives Violated Gag Order, Prosecutors
Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1996, at 25A.
264. Gonzalez, Human Tragedy, supra note 19.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Steve Scott, Routier Defense May Face Tough Jury in Kerrville, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 21, 1996, at 1A.
269. Steve Scott, Only Routier’s Blood Found, Analysts Testify, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jan. 22, 1997, at 1A. The loaded term “trailer trash” did not surface in print until a
confrontation between prosecutors and the Routier family outside the courtroom led one
prosecutor to riposte, in a widely reported incident, “Do I have to interview in front of this
trailer trash?” See id.; see also supra note 250.
270. Steve Scott, Detective Says Routier Never Denied Slayings; Amnesia May Explain
Her Comments, Psychiatrist Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1A
[hereinafter Scott, Detective Says].
271. See id.; see also Kelley Shannon, Prosecutor Says Mother Killed Sons, Staged
Crime, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 7, 1997, at B1. Months after her third child was born,
“She was no longer the glamorous, blond center of attention,” Assistant District Attorney
Greg Davis pronounced in his opening statement. Id.
272. Scott, Detective Says, supra note 270.
273. John W. Gonzalez, Routier’s Suicide Thoughts, Depression Over Money Woes
Described, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1997, at A29 [hereinafter Gonzalez, Suicide Thoughts].
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Scott, Detective Says, supra note 270; Shannon, supra note 271.
277. Stefani G. Kopenec, Rowlett Mother Takes to Airwaves to Proclaim Her Innocence,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 1996; see also Case Unfolded, supra note 247.
278. Steve Scott, Routier Considers Hiring Lawyer Mulder, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
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had the trial moved to Kerrville.279 The defense team tried unsuccessfully
to move the trial from rural and conservative Kerrville back to Dallas.280
Despite this rebuff, the defense team was cautiously optimistic in
anticipation of the verdict in the guilt and innocence phase of the trial.281
The defense believed that they had established reasonable doubt: 282 they
believed they had undermined the circumstantial case that Darlie
perpetrated the murders. 283 Further, they believed that the state could not
overcome its failure to produce any plausible motive for the destruction of
the children in the face of testimony from family, friends and Darlie herself
that she was a good mother. 284 As one member of the trial team put it, “It
makes no sense that this lady would change from a good mother, a doting
mother, to a psychotic killer.” 285 She, however, was found guilty of the
murder of her children. 286
Unlike Smith and Yates, Routier denied she had killed her children. As
a consequence, it was the state, not the defense, that was in a position to
exploit some evidence that she was depressed and suicidal, the kind of
evidence that the defense in the Yates and Smith cases had been able to use
to mitigate blame. 287 Financial retrenchment and lost glamour fueled
depression and suicidal thoughts. 288 Despondency loosened her moral
inhibitions. 289 It appears that the Routier defense was never able to do
what the Smith defense achieved: to neutralize bad facts about the
defendant’s character that might well influence jury members to see the
defendant not only as a bad woman but a bad mother.
The Smith defense took stories about Susan’s promiscuousness 290 and
pursuit of a wealthy boyfriend and wove them into a narrative of an
Sept. 5, 1996, at 28A.
279. Case Unfolded, supra note 247.
280. Id.
281. See Steve Scott & Michael Saul, Routier Tells Prosecutor He’s Lying; Jury to
Resume Deliberations in Mom’s Murder Trial Today, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.1,
1997, at 1A.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.; Ralph Winingham, Defense Uses Emotion in Trial of Rowlett Mom, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 8A.
285. Scott & Saul, supra note 281.
286. Case Unfolded, supra note 247.
287. John W. Gonzalez, Diary Reveals Suicidal Routier Weeks Before the Killing, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 25, 1997, at A1. For example, it was the prosecution that introduced passages
of her diary to establish suicidal instability and depression, over protests by the defense that
the diary passages would be taken out of context of the diary in its entirety. Id.
288. See Gonzalez, Suicide Thoughts, supra note 273.
289. See id.
290. Bragg, Smith Jury, supra note 233.
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immature woman suffering from chronic depression, driven to suicidal
desperation by childhood and adolescent trauma, 291 a cold mother,292 a
sexually exploitive stepfather,293 an unfaithful, 294 overbearing husband,295
and a rejecting boyfriend.296 The defense not only explained Smith’s
deficiencies but explained them in such a way as to leave intact the picture
of Smith as a loving mother. The defense story was that Susan went to
Smith Lake to take her own life, taking the boys because she could not bear
to leave the boys motherless in this cruel world. When Susan bolted from
the car—when her body resisted the destruction her mind had planned—
she may well not have been cognizant of the fact that her sons were in the
car, trapped and doomed.
During both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the Routier trial, a
mounting litany of trashy Darlie testimony undermined the good mother
defense. The Routier defense allowed the trashy Darlie story to unfold
unchallenged and unintegrated into a defense narrative. Perhaps the
defense thought that being a good mother was a sufficient antidote to these
bad facts. In any event, they did not address the problem the Smith defense
understood: a good mother is, at least prima facie, a good woman; she
possesses the middle-class virtues of fidelity and chastity, modesty and
decorum. Deviations from the ideal of wife as well as mother had to be
explained or the good mother designation was in peril of being supplanted
by an incompatible label, like “trash.” Whatever the role, if any, these bad
facts may have played in the jury’s verdict at the guilt and innocence phase
of the trial, the prosecution recycled and built upon them in the penalty
phase of the trial. The defense went into the penalty phase in any case
hampered by the awkward position, familiar in capital trials, of asking for
mercy from a jury that believed the defendant had lied about her guilt.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury learned some new bad facts
about Darlie. An erstwhile friend testified that Routier feared the police
would find her store of sex toys when they searched the house.297 The jury
heard testimony that she was a “tacky dresser,” 298 and did not wear a bra or

291. Id.
292. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
293. Rick Bragg, Defending Smith, Stepfather Says He Also Bears Blame, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1995, at A10.
294. Decker & LeBlanc, supra note 231.
295. See Al Dozier, Defense Paints Harsh Picture of David Smith, HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), July 27, 1995, at 6A.
296. Bragg, Arguments Begin, supra note 53.
297. Gonzalez, Suicide Thoughts, supra note 273.
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underwear. 299 The prosecution also directly attacked Routier as a mother,
bringing forth testimony that she cursed at the boys, 300 had on one occasion
smeared cake on the face of Devon at a birthday party, 301 was not a careful
supervisor of the boys in the house and the neighborhood, 302 and had
offered marijuana to a teenage babysitter.303
In the Routier case, the prosecution succeeded in pulling Darlie off the
good mother pedestal from which prosecutors were unable to dislodge
Yates and Smith in the penalty phase of their trials. Routier was laboring
under two burdens faced by neither: lack of admission of guilt and lack of
ability to make mental troubles work for her. It was the prosecution that
deployed that evidence to help create for the jury a scenario in which a
mother might kill, that of a selfish woman in the grip of irrational
resentments that loosened ego controls. In two of these death penalty
cases, juries were moved by pity for good mothers who had done the
unthinkable under the sway of grievous maladies; in the third, the verdict
was that the defendant was not a good mother.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps one day we will be able to wean ourselves from our fascination
with maternal virtue and pay honest heed to children at risk, whether
because of the mental illness or privations of their parents and household
intimates. If and when we do, we will be breaking with centuries of
censorious confusion between the goals of promoting maternal virtue and
punishing female vice, and that of protecting children.
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